Madam Secretary S05E05 400p ColdFilm avi | Dragon Ball – Bảy Viên Ngọc Rồng chap 253 | Sons of Anarchy

THE AMERICAS BAROMETER COLOMBIA. Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation


Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Tamaño: px
Comenzar la demostración a partir de la página:

Download "THE AMERICAS BAROMETER COLOMBIA. Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation"

Transcripción

1 THE AMERICAS BAROMETER COLOMBIA Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation

2 Democracy Observatory Faculty Social Sciences Department Political Science Management - Miguel García Sánchez, Ph.D. Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga, Ph.D. Universidad de los Andes, Colombia Editorial Board - Sebastian Pantoja Barrios Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Catalina Barragán Lizarazo Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Juan Camilo Plata Caviedes Universidad de los Andes, Colombia Contributors (Graduate Assistants) - Lorena Catalina Rodríguez Moreno - María José Urbina Flórez - Nicolás Galvis Ramírez - Stefannia Parrado Morales - Mariana Saldarriaga Osorio - David Baracaldo Orjuela - Martín Rodríguez Rocha Proofreader Juan Camilo Bierman López Design Toquica. Estudio de Diseño ISSN: Social ObsDemocracia Cover Photo PointImages Shutterstock.com This study was developed with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The content is the sole responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government. April, Edition 01

3 The Americas Barometer Colombia 2016 Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation

4 Table of Contents

5 06 Presentation 037 The Agreement 08 Survey Description Attitudes Towards Reconciliation and Post-Conflict 011 Glossary 013 Introduction Victimization due to the Armed Conflict 058 Post-Conflict and Returning to Civilian Life Conclusions 071 References Negotiated Solution to the Conflict, Illegal Armed Actors and the Peace Agreement with the farc-ep 031 The Plebiscite 072 Appendix A: Regression Models 078 Appendix B: The 2016 Americas Barometer Questionnaire 05

6 Presentation The Observatorio de la Democracia (Democracy Observatory) is the academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behaviour of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes. For more than a decade it has been responsible for carrying out in Colombia the main public opinion study of the American continent: the Americas Barometer. Through this rigorous study of public opinion in Colombia, with historical comparability of the last 12 years and comparability between countries of the continent, the Democracy Observatory interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians with regard to structural and current issues, informing government, authorities, academia and the population in general, in order to contribute in this way to the creation of public policies, initiatives, actions and debates with regard to key issues The Americas Barometer is a public opinion survey conducted in 27 countries of the Americas under the coordination of Vanderbilt University. Currently, the Democracy Observatory of the University of the Andes is carrying out this study with the support and financing of USAID, which allows the country to have annual updated information, through national surveys in even years and special surveys in odd-numbered years In the case of the 2016 study, the general report will be available, as well as some segmented reports that deal with specific topics such as peace, post-conflict and reconciliation, gender, democracy and institutions, inequality, ethnic groups and sexual diversity, among others. All of them will be available in print and digital version on the Democracy Observatory website: The Americas Barometer 2016 study of Colombia was made possible thanks to the collaboration of several institutions. The joint work of the Democracy Observatory, the University of the Andes and USAID is of note, as well is the support given by the company IPSOS and the Vanderbilt University with the fieldwork. All of this was complemented by the work of the team of facilitators and graduate assistants of the Democracy Observatory, composed of Sebastián Pantoja, Lorena Catalina Rodríguez, María José Urbina, Nicolás 06

7 Galvis, Stefannia Parrado, Mariana Saldarriaga, David Baracaldo and Martín Rodríguez. This study was developed with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The content is the sole responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government. 07

8 Survey Description The fieldwork for the 2016 Americas Barometer study of Colombia took place between August 3 and October 29, 2016 and was carried out by the company IPSOS. The population of the study was all non-institutionalized Colombian residents of legal age (i.e., those living in prisons, schools, hospitals and military bases were excluded). The sample size chosen was 1,512 individuals within this population, thus guaranteeing that the sample represents said population with a 2.5% margin of error. The method of selection of these individuals (sampling method) was probabilistic, stratified and multi-stage, with random selection of sampling units at each stage. Below is an explanation of each of these elements: Probabilistic, as each individual in the population had an equal chance of being chosen for the study, i.e., all individuals were equally likely to be selected to respond to the survey. This was achieved by random selection of sampling units from each selection stage, as will be explained below. Stratified, because in addition to representing the total population, the study sample represents population groups (sample strata) within that population, thus defined: Population in the six main regions of the country: Bogotá, Caribbean, Central, Eastern, Pacific and the Antiguos Territorios Nacionales (Former National Territories). Population in municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants (small), in municipalities with a population between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (medium), and municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (large). Population in urban and rural areas. In order to guarantee the representativeness of the sample of the study in each of these sample strata, the number of respondents was calculated so that the proportion of respondents in each stratum corresponds to the real proportion of inhabitants of that stratum 08

9 over the total sample population. For example, the Caribbean region is home to 19.3% of Colombians of voting age (according to the population projection for 2016 from the 2005 National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE, its acronym in Spanish) general census). In the study sample, the total number of respondents in this region also corresponded to 19.3% of the total sample, which guarantees that such respondents represent the entire population of the Caribbean region. Multistage, as each of the sampling units was randomly chosen, which are groups of residential places inhabited by individuals in the sample population. Random selection of these units was carried out in four stages, namely: Stage 1. Random selection of primary sampling units, that were localities for the selection of respondents in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla (because they are the largest cities in the country); and municipalities for the selection of respondents in the rest of the country. A total of 63 primary sampling units were selected, distributed in such a way that all the specified sample strata were represented. Stage 2. Random selection of cartographic sectors (sets of suburban blocks or rural districts defined by DANE), within each locality or municipality. Four sectors were selected within each locality or municipality. Stage 3. Random selection of cartographic clusters (suburban blocks or rural districts) within each cartographic sector. A single cluster was selected for each cartographic sector. Stage 4. Random selection of a household inhabiting each block or rural district (a single household per dwelling). After random selection of each household according to the process described above was made, the surveyors administered the survey to only one household member, fulfilling the quotas of sex (male and female) and age (18-30, 31-45, and over 46). Thus, in each cartographic cluster, six interviews had to be carried out, each in a different household (since many of the survey questions referred to the respondent s household), in order to complete the specified sex and age quotas. This prevented the total sample from being unbalanced by sex or age. Thus, the total number of respondents in each cartographic sector was 24 (six for each cartographic cluster), and the total number of respondents to the survey is 1,512 (63 primary sampling units, each with 24 respondents). 09

10 Due to issues in the development of fieldwork, 49 additional interviews were conducted, so the total number of respondents in the study was 1,563. These additional interviews did not increase the number of interviews per primary sampling unit to more than 28 (i.e., four more than the 24 surveys planned); and they were evenly distributed among the sample strata, so that the representativeness of the sample was not significantly affected. With regard to data collection, as in previous years, electronic devices were used. However, for this version of the Americas Barometer in Colombia, the SurveyToGo application was used, which allowed a strict and detailed control of the fieldwork, as well as the introduction of experiments within the survey. The questionnaire included 368 questions, divided into two large groups. The first consisted of the common core of questions used by all the Americas Barometer studies, in order to have a comparative perspective of public opinion across the continent. The second group, specific to the study of Colombia, covered a series of modules focusing on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People s Army (FARC-EP, its acronym in Spanish) and the possible obstacles it could face, as well as opinions on actors and institutions in the Colombian context and on reconciliation after the end of the armed conflict. However, the order of the questions in the questionnaire used did not address the division into these two groups, but rather the organization addresses the need for the questionnaire to be user-friendly and easy for the interviewer to apply. 010

11 Glossary Democracy Observatory: an academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes, based in Bogotá (Colombia). Americas Barometer-LAPOP: a public opinion study conducted in the Americas that explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of people in the Americas regarding democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by the Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville, Tennessee. Population (sample universe): a group of subjects to be studied or understood. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the population is made up of all non-institutionalized adults residing in Colombia. Observation unit (analysis unit): units that make up the sample population. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized adult resident in Colombia. Sample: a group within the sample population, which seeks to represent this population to obtain information about it, with a certain margin of error. Stratification: A process that consists of defining the populations within the sample population to be represented in the survey. For example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc. Parameter: A calculation obtained from the measurement made on all individuals in a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census. Estimator: A calculation obtained from the measurement made on individuals of a representative sample of the sample population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measurement of the parameters. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the DANE s Large Integrated Household Survey. 011

12 Margin of error: Represents the degree of inaccuracy in the estimators, since it is an approximate measure of the parameters. For example, starting from a population of 10 million people of voting age, when conducting a census (i.e., an exhaustive study of the entire population), 28% (2,800,000 people) say they support candidate A. However, as this census is practically impossible to carry out, the study concentrates on a representative portion or sample of this population, which gives the same result of 28%, but with a margin of error of approximately 2%. With this it can be asserted that between 26% and 30% of the members of the population say they support candidate A. Confidence interval: A range of estimated possible values. The value we are looking for is in that range with a given level of certainty. If, following the above example, we have an error margin of 2% and a 95% confidence level, we can assert, with 95% certainty, that the value we are trying to estimate is between 26% and 30%. This is the 95% confidence interval. Variable: An attribute or characteristic that can change from one observation unit to another (people, countries, etc.). Examples of variables are: age, ethnic origin, gender, socioeconomic level, educational level, among others. 012

13 Introduction The armed conflict within the country was the main problem for Colombians until Between 2009 and 2014, other issues - including economic ones - took a prominent place in the minds of respondents. In 2016, the concerns of Colombians returned to the armed conflict. There is no doubt that this change in public opinion on the country s main problems has much to do with the signing of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, as well as with the public debates generated around that agreement. Given the current situation in the country, it is essential to study and understand the opinions and attitudes of the people towards what is generally called peace and post-conflict. Since 2013, the Democracy Observatory s study of the Americas Barometer on Colombia has included a module of questions related to the peace process, transitional justice and post-conflict. For the 2016 version, this study also included questions related to respondents perceptions of the peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and FARC-EP. Thus, the purpose of this report is to present in detail the attitudes, opinions and experiences of citizens on: armed conflict, the peace agreement, the political participation of demobilized ex-combatants, transitional justice and the reintegration of demobilized people into civil society. The presentation and analysis of these opinions and attitudes will be done in a way that it compares the results of previous studies, offering also, from a regional perspective, the results produced by some questions. The report is divided into four parts. Firstly, it presents information on the victimization due to the armed conflict and opinions about the negotiated solution to the war. The second part deals with everything related to the peace agreement with the FARC-EP. It should be noted that support for the peace agreement decreased in 2016 compared to the results of 2013 and 2014 (in these years, support for the peace process was asked). Similarly, scepticism about the effectiveness of what has been achieved in Havana (Cuba) persists, as two out of three Colombians believe it is unlikely or impossible for the current peace agreement to lead to a definitive demobilization of the FARC-EP. 013

14 At the same time, Colombians persist in their rejection of the FARC s political participation. The third part analyses attitudes towards reconciliation and post-conflict. Here we see that, faced with a post-conflict scenario, perceptions of forgiveness and reconciliation, as well as the challenges of a reintegration process for demobilized FARC-EP members, have improved between 2013 and These results indicate that, despite Colombians persistently rejecting political and justice concessions for the demobilized FARC-EP members, the attitudes of the public towards post-conflict situations show a positive evolution. Finally, the last section is devoted to the findings of the study. 014

15 Notes

16 1. Victimization due to the Armed Conflict

17 In the lives of Colombians, 2016 was a momentous year due to the result of the signing of the final peace agreement with the FARC-EP, and the beginning of peace talks with National Liberation Army (ELN, its acronym in Spanish). To better understand this situation, it is necessary to analyse the behavior of armed conflict victimization in 2016 and its variation over time. Therefore, the Americas Barometer-LAPOP asked respondents if they have lost any relatives, or if any relatives have been disappeared, or if any relatives had to take refuge and leave their homes because of the armed conflict. These three situations measure the armed conflict victimization through a close third party, particularly from homicides, forced disappearances and change of residence. In addition, victimization due to forced exile was measured by asking respondents if they have any relatives who had to leave the country; victimization due to forced displacement by asking respondents if they have a family member who was stripped of their land; and victimization due to kidnapping by asking respondents if they have a family member who was kidnapped. The 2016 study indicates that levels of historical victimization due to armed conflict have remained stable since During this period ( ), approximately 30% to 35% of Colombians reported that a family member was affected by the armed conflict (Figure 1). Three point five per cent of respondents indicated that the victimization occurred in 2015, the year immediately preceding the survey. 017

18 Figure 1. Historical Victimization due to Armed Conflict, % 28.7% 29.8% 35.3% 37.7% 34.1%31.5% 32.7%33.7% 32.6% 34.1% 35.2% % Víctima del conflicto % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country s armed conflict? Or do you have a family member who has been disappeared due to the conflict? As a result of the conflict, did any family members have to leave the country? And did any member of your family have to become a refugee or leave their place of residence because of the conflict in the country? Has any member of your family been kidnapped? Is it because of the armed conflict that a member of your family was stripped of their land? Regarding forms of victimization due to armed conflict 1, the 2016 study indicates that becoming a refugee and loss of a family member are the most common occurrences (Figure 2). Similarly, data indicate that 49% of the respondents reported that one of their relatives was forced by the conflict to leave their place of residence in exile, or as a displaced person or refugee. 1 The five forms of armed conflict victimization investigated by the study are: (1) kidnapping, (2) in exile, (3) refugee, (4) forced displacement and (5) loss of a family member. It is important to bear in mind that these five forms of victimization investigated by the study do not exhaust all possible forms of conflict-affection. 018

19 Figure 2. Forms of Victimization due to Armed Conflict, % 23.0% 23.9% 15 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño 10 incorporado) 5.2% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP % Familiar secuestrado Familiar exiliado Familiar desplazado Pérdida de familiar Familiar refugiado Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country s armed conflict? Or do you have a family member who has been disappeared due to the conflict? As a result of the conflict, did any family members have to leave the country? And did any member of your family have to become a refugee or leave their place of residence because of the conflict in the country? Has any member of your family been kidnapped? Is it because of the armed conflict that a member of your family was stripped of their land? In the context of the armed conflict that Colombia has suffered, the results of the 2016 study present the guerrillas as the main perpetrators of victimization, with 58.3%. However, if the figures for paramilitaries, criminal gangs and exparamilitaries are combined, these organizations are reported as perpetrators by 60.5% of those affected by the violence (Figure 3). The guerrillas continue to be the main perpetrators of victimization in the armed conflict context in Colombia (58.3%) 019

20 Figure 3. Responsible for the Victimization Events, % % % 16.4% 9.0% 5.4% 2.6% Policía Ejército Exparamilitares Otro actor BACRIM Paramilitares Guerrillas 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP Which group or groups were responsible for these events? The guerrillas The paramilitaries The army The police Emerging criminal gangs Former paramilitaries who have regrouped Others One of the most relevant aspects, with a view to post-conflict, is the identification and reparation of victims of the armed conflict. That is why the Democracy Observatory has been monitoring - since the percentage of respondents who are part of the Registro Único de Víctimas (Single Registry of Victims) and the number of people who, as part of the Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV), have received some kind of reparation from the national government. The percentage of respondents who report that they are part of the RUV doubled between 2013 and 2016, from 5.2% to 10.7% (Figure 4). Similarly, between 2013 and 2016, the percentage of people on the RUV who claimed to have received some type of reparation (the study does not specify the types of reparations) increased substantially, from 22.5% in 2012 to 44.3% in 2016 (Figure 5). This increase could be interpreted as a favorable indicator of the implementation of policies aimed at compensating victims of the conflict. 020

21 Figure 4. Registration with the Single Registry of Victims 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP % que hace parte del Registro Nacional de Víctimas % 6.9% 5.2% Are you part of the Single Registry of Armed Conflict Victims? Figure 5. Victims Registered in the RUV who have Received some form of Reparation from the Government , 2013 and % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP % de víctimas que ha recibido reparación % 33.8% 44.3% Have you received any kind of reparation from the national government? 021

22 Notes

23 Notes

24 2. Negotiated Solution to the Conflict, Illegal Armed Actors and the Peace Agreement with the farc-ep

25 Since 2004, the Americas Barometer has researched the views of Colombians on possible alternatives for resolving the armed conflict with the guerrillas. As Figure 6 shows, during the last 12 years most Colombians have favored a negotiated solution over a military solution. That preference reached its lowest level in 2011 (54.6%) and its highest level in 2008 and 2016 (67.4%). While in 2016 there was an increase in the number of people who favored the negotiated route, the percentage of interviewees (0.9%) who favored both the use of military force and negotiation virtually disappeared. This could be interpreted as the result that, at present, negotiation and the use of force are perceived as mutually exclusive, i.e., not complementary, options. 67% of Colombians support a negotiated solution to the armed conflict in Colombia. However, only 41% support the peace agreement with the farc-ep 025

26 Figure 6. Alternatives for a Solution to the Armed Conflict with the Guerrillas, % 8.3% 4.0% 5.0% 3.6% 4.9% 4.2% 6.5% 8.2% 9.9% 10.3% 6.4% 0.9% 80% 31.2% 28.9% 28.3% 30.2% 28.0% 31.4% 32.7% 37.3% 32.3% 31.6% 35.5% 31.6% 60% Solución al conflicto con la guerilla 40% 20% 60.5% 67.1% 66.8% 66.3% 67.1% 64.4% 60.7% 54.6% 57.8% 58.1% 58.1% 67.4% Ambas Uso de la fuerza militar Negociación 0% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP Of the following options for resolving the conflict with the guerrillas, which do you think is the best? Negotiation Use of force Both Like the negotiated solution with the guerrillas, confidence in illegal armed groups also increased significantly. Despite the fact that the percentage of respondents who said they trusted these organizations does not exceed 7%, confidence in the FARC-EP rose from 1.1% in 2014 to 6.2% in 2016; and, for the same period, confidence in the ELN rose from 2.0% to 4.6% (Figure 7). Although the percentage of interviewees who trust these guerrillas remains very small, this increase may be directly associated with the peace process that has been advanced in recent years, which has managed to arouse greater confidence in the guerrillas among some segments of the population, or has generated a more favorable context for expressing positive opinions towards these organizations. 026

27 Figure 7. Confidence in Illegal Armed Actors, FARC % 1.8% 1.1% 6.2% ELN % 2.0% 1.6% 4.6% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP BACRIM 2.0% 0.8% 1.4% 0.2% How much do you trust the FARC-EP? How much do you trust the ELN? How much do you trust the criminal or emerging gangs? See Card B (Appendix B). Confidence in illegal armed groups (farc y eln) increased significantly in 2016, even though the percentage of respondents who said they trust these organizations does not exceed 7%. Another way of assessing trust in armed groups is related to Colombians expectation that these organizations, particularly the FARC-EP, will fulfil their commitments under the peace agreement. Thus, the Americas Barometer surveyed how likely the public thinks the definitive demobilization of this organization and the complete cessation of its activities related to drug trafficking will be. The percentage of people who do not believe that a definitive demobilization of the 027

28 FARC-EP will take place has remained stable since 2013, around 70% (Figure 8). Despite the signing of the peace agreement, Colombians are deeply sceptical about the possibility that the FARC-EP may actually demobilize, even though the peace agreement provides all the political and security guarantees for this demobilization to take place. That is to say, the unfavorable image of this organization weighs more heavily than the peace negotiations that took place during Similarly, 81.4% of those surveyed saw little or no likelihood of the FARC-EP abandoning the drug trafficking business (Figure 9). In short, the FARC-EP are still viewed with deep disbelief by the public. Despite the signing of the peace agreement, Colombians are deeply sceptical about the possibility that the farc-ep will actually demobilize. 81.4% of respondents see little or no likelihood of the farc-ep abandoning the drug trafficking business. 028

29 Figure 8. Possibility of a Definitive Demobilization of the FARC-EP, 2013, 2014 and Posible o muy posible 32.4% Poco o nada posible 67.6% 2014 Posible o muy posible 28.9% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Poco o nada posible Posible o muy posible % 71.1% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP Poco o nada posible % How possible do you think that after the signing of the peace agreements between the government and the FARC-EP, that this guerrilla group will definitively demobilize? Very possible, possible, not very possible, not at all possible. Figure 9. Possibility of the FARC-EP Abandoning the Drug Trafficking Business, 2016 Posible o muy posible 16.6% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP Poco o nada posible 81.4% And how possible do you think that after the signing of the peace agreements between the government and the FARC-EP that this guerrilla group will stop drug trafficking? Very possible, possible, not very possible, not at all possible. From a regional point of view, the scepticism about the definitive demobilization of the FARC-EP does not vary significantly (Figure 10), although it is slightly lower in the Caribbean region and stronger in the Central region. 029

30 Figure 10. Possibility of a Definitive Demobilization of the FARC-EP, by Region, 2016 Posible o muy posible Poco o nada posible Posible o muy posible Poco o nada posible Caribe Pacífica 35.9% 34.0% 62.1% 64.6% Posible o muy posible Poco o nada posible Posible o muy posible Poco o nada posible Posible o muy posible Poco o nada posible Oriental Bogotá Central 30.0% 27.6% 33.4% 64.2% 69.2% 70.9% % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP How possible do you think that after the signing of the peace agreements between the government and the FARC-EP, that this guerrilla group will definitively demobilize? Very possible, possible, not very possible, not at all possible 030

31 The Plebiscite One of the most relevant events of 2016 was the opportunity for a popular referendum of the peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP. The triumph of the no vote in the October 2, 2016 plebiscite and the erroneous polling forecasts represent a challenge for public opinion studies. In this sense, the 2016 study by the Democracy Observatory provides some elements which enable a clearer diagnosis of the results obtained on October 2. First, the 2016 survey was able to identify that 67% of those polled supported the use of a popular vote to endorse the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP. More than a third of those polled said they would not vote in that plebiscite. A similar amount said it would vote in favor; and only 20% responded that it would vote against (Figure 11). It can be seen then that the question about the voting intention used in the 2016 study did not correctly identify the public s behavior in the plebiscite. It is likely - as some pollster companies indicated - that many citizens who voted against it on October 2, did not reveal their preference when interviewed, preferring to respond that they did not plan to vote in the plebiscite. Figure 11. Intention to Vote in the Plebiscite % Votaría a favor 38.0% % Votaría en contra 20.1% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) % No votaría 37.5% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP % NS/NR 4.4% And in the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC-EP, how would you vote? 031

32 However, due to the fact that the fieldwork of the 2016 Americas Barometer study was carried out during the weeks prior to the plebiscite about the agreement, it is possible to disaggregate the data by interview date, which clarifies the panorama of voting intention. As Figure 12 shows, prior to the signing of the agreement - which took place on September 27 in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) - the percentage of yes supporters clearly exceeded those who planned to vote no. However, after the signing of the agreement in Cartagena, the percentage of people reporting that they would not vote declined; and supporters of the agreement did not increase. These data suggest that the first event in which the government and FARC-EP signed the Havana agreements might have led some people, who were not planning to vote, to decide to vote no. It is important to note that at the time of the signing of the agreement in Cartagena, the yes and no campaigns did not reach their peak, so it is possible that other factors related to these campaigns also affected the voting intention in the plebiscite. Figure 12. Evolution of Voting Intent in the Plebiscite, August-October 2016 No votaría 50 Votaría a favor % 38.7% 19.0% 38.8% 36.8% 19.6% 38.4% 29.3% 28.3% Votaría en contra NS/NR 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) % 4.8% 4.0% 0 Declaración Habana, agosto 24 Firma en Cartagena, septiembre 27 Plebiscito, octubre 2 N=589 N=673 N=99 Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP And in the event that a popular vote was held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC-EP, how would you vote? The time disaggregation of the data on voting intention makes it necessary to compare the percentages of this indicator using subsets of the sample that are not perfectly balanced. Therefore, in order to more solidly support the hypothesis that, as certain events prior to the plebiscite vote took place, the number of Colombians planning to vote no increased, an exercise was carried out to predict the intention of voting in the plebiscite as October 2 approached. The entire sample was used for this exercise. Figures 13, 14 and 032

33 Key points: Why didn t the polls predict that the no vote would win the plebiscite? Following the signing of the peace agreement in Cartagena, the percentage of those in favor of no, who had previously decided to abstain from voting, increased. At the time of the signing of Cartagena, the yes and no campaigns did not reach their climax, but in the week before the vote it was not possible to publish polls to measure the impact of these campaigns. Within a week of the plebiscite, the odds of voting yes or no were almost equal. The probability of not voting fell two weeks before the plebiscite.

34 15 indicate, respectively, the probability that respondents would support yes, support no and choose not to vote in the plebiscite. Seven weeks before the plebiscite, the probability of voting yes did stabilize between 35 and 39% (Figure 13). On the other hand, the probability of voting no went from 16% eight weeks before October 2, to almost 40% two weeks before the date (Figure 14). By the last week of September, the intentions to vote yes and no were virtually the same. Meanwhile, the probability of abstaining from voting fell two weeks before October 2, although there was a slight increase as the plebiscite grew near (Figure 15). Figure 13. Expected Probability of Voting yes to the Plebiscite by Number of Weeks before October % % 38.8% 39.2% 34.9% 35.0% 36.8% 35.1% Votaría a favor % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Semanas antes 0 8 SA 7 SA 6 SA 5 SA 4 SA 3 SA 2 SA 1 SA Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP 034

35 Figure 14. Expected Probability of Voting no in the Plebiscite by Number of Weeks before October % % 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Votaría en contra % 21.2% 19.4% 20.4% 24.5% 24.6% Semanas antes 10 Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP 0 8 SA 7 SA 6 SA 5 SA 4 SA 3 SA 2 SA 1 SA Figure 15. Expected Probability of Abstaining from Voting in the Plebiscite According to the Number of Weeks before October % 39.5% 38.6% 36.8% 36.3% 37.7% 32.0% 26.3% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) No votaría Semanas antes 10 Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP 0 8 SA 7 SA 6 SA 5 SA 4 SA 3 SA 2 SA 1 SA Based on a model of multinomial logistic regression 2, the factors associated with the intention of voting in the plebiscite were studied. Table 1 makes it clear that the probability of voting yes was significantly higher among older men, supporters of the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) or the Polo Democrático (Democratic Pole), with high levels of presidential approval and political interest 3. 2 This type of model analyzes in a joint way the alternatives that the person surveyed had regarding the plebiscite question (voting for, against or not voting) and the individual factors that affected the choice of one particular alternative over another. 3 The complete results of the model estimation can be found in the Table. A.1 (Appendix A). 035

36 Table 1. Determinants of Voting Intent in the Plebiscite Woman - Yes No Abstaining Years of education - Age + Victim of the guerrilla Wealth quintiles - Urban area Progressive - Conservatism (social/ moral dimension) Ideology (left/right) Index of religiousness Former National Territories - Pacific region Eastern region + Central region Caribbean region Supportive of the Partido Liberal + - Supportive of the Centro Democrático - + Supportive of the Partido de la U Supportive of the Polo Democrático + Alternativo Supportive of the Partido Cambio Radical Supportive of the Partido Conservador Trust in the FARC-EP + - Presidential approval Interest in politics Political knowledge - Proximity to the plebiscite in days + 036

37 The Agreement In addition to the question on voting intentions, the 2016 Americas Barometer survey explored public support for the peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP. Past surveys (2013 and 2014) had explored support for The Peace Process, which had been over 50%. Surprisingly, by 2016, support for The Peace Agreement was 41% (Figure 16). This seems to indicate that, as the peace process materialized into an agreement, popular support decreased as a result of the socialization of what was agreed upon or as a result of the intensification of public debate around the process and the contents of the agreement. In other words, there were Colombians who went from supporting the peace process to not supporting the agreement, possibly because they did not agree with the concessions made to the FARC-EP. In this process, both 41% of Colombians in 2016 supported the peace agreement, while in 2013 and 2014, support for the peace process was at 53%. the criticisms that were made of the Havana agreements and the disinformation that spread about them played a very important role. 037

38 Figure 16. Support for the Peace Process ( ) and for the Peace Agreement (2016) % 53.4% % % apoya Año 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP The government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement? See Card B (Appendix B). Views on support for the peace process (Figure 17) reveal that a higher percentage of respondents said they did not support the Havana agreements. This question, unlike the question of voting intention, seems to capture better the opinion of Colombians on this pact. From a regional point of view, support for the peace process is significantly higher in the Pacific region at 51.2%, compared to Central (35.9%) and Eastern (34.4%) regions. Support for the peace process is significantly higher in the Pacific region with 51.2% approval. 038

39 Figure 17. Support for the Peace Agreement, 2016 Apoya 40.8% Indiferente/indeciso 12.8% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) No apoya 46.4% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP When a temporarily disaggregated analysis of support for the peace agreement is made (Figure 18), the study shows that levels of no support for the agreement were from the outset higher than those of support, although not significantly higher. After the event in Cartagena on September 27, there was a slight increase in no support and a slight reduction in indifference/indecision and support. Figure 18. Evolution of Support for the Peace Agreement, August-October 2016 See Card B (Appendix B). No apoya 80 Apoya Indiferente/indeciso % 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) % 41.7% 47.3% 40.8% 37.4% 42.1% 39.6% % 12.4% 11.9% 10.1% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP 0 Declaración Habana, agosto 24 Firma en Cartagena, septiembre 27 Plebiscito, octubre 2 Después de resultado plebiscito N=589 N=673 N=99 N=202 From a regional point of view, the study shows that the Pacific region has a significantly higher level of support for the agreement than the Central and Eastern regions (Figure 19). This coincides with the voting patterns recorded in the October 2 plebiscite. 039

40 Figure 19. Support for the Peace Agreement by Region, % % 38.0% 35.9% 34.4% % apoya % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) 0 Caribe Bogotá Central Oriental Pacífica Región Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP The government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement? In a regression analysis of the determinants of support for the peace agreement, the study reveals that the most likely supporters are individuals interested in politics, who approve of President Santos government, who have greater confidence in the FARC-EP, and are supporters of the Polo Democrático, the Partido Liberal or the Partido de la U. The rejection of the peace agreement is fundamentally driven by support for the Centro Democrático. In other words, those who support this party are the least supportive of the agreement. The latter makes it clear that opposition to the agreement is strongly influenced by the main leader of the Centro Democrático, Álvaro Uribe (Table 2) 4. 4 The complete model estimation results are shown in the Table. A.1. (Appendix A): 040

41 Who is most supportive of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP? Colombians interested in politics. Colombians who approve the government of President Juan Manuel Santos. Colombians who express greater confidence in the FARC-EP. Colombians who express support for the Polo Democrático. Partido Liberal y Partido de la U 041

42 Table 2. Determinants of Support for the Peace Agreement Woman Years of education Age Victim of the guerrilla Wealth quintiles Urban area Progressive - Conservatism (social/moral dimension) Ideology (left/right) + Index of religiousness Former National Territories Pacific region Eastern region Central region Caribbean region Supportive of the Partido Liberal + Supportive of the Centro Democrático Supportive of the Partido de la U + Supportive of the Polo Democrático Alternativo + Supportive of the Partido Cambio Radical Supportive of the Partido Conservador Trust in the FARC-EP + Presidential approval + Interest in politics + Political knowledge N=1264 The Democracy Observatory also explored 11 components of the peace agreement. It was evident that the levels of support for them vary greatly (Figure 20). While 80% support agrarian reform, only 21% support amnesty for guerrillas. In general terms, it can be concluded that the least support is given to those components that involve some concession towards the FARC-EP (amnesty, rural zones, conditions for political participation, special constituency of peace). 042

43 Most and least support for the peace agreement (+) 80% of Colombians support agrarian reform. (-) 21% of Colombians support amnesty for guerrillas. Figure 20. Support of the Components of the Peace Agreement, % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Reforma agraria Cárcel, más de 8 años Zonas de reserva campesina Dejación de armas, ONU Igualdad en justicia para guerrilleros y militares Privación de la libertad Circunscripción especial de paz Cultivos de coca bajo supervisión estatal Condiciones igualitarias partidos políticos Concentración en zonas veredales Amnistía miembros rasos 79.8% 71.6% 64.8% 60.3% 59.2% 55.9% 54.2% 36.3% 32.3% 31.7% 21.0% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP At the negotiating table in Havana, the government and the FARC-EP have reached several agreements. I would like to ask your opinion on some of them. It was agreed that members of the FARC-EP, who are responsible for atrocious crimes and confess their crimes, should pay between five (5) and eight (8) years imprisonment. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that congressional seats for the regions most affected by the armed conflict would be reserved, so that these regions will have greater representation in Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that Peasant Farmer Reserve Zones would be created which will benefit small producers and not be sold to large companies. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed to distribute vacant land among peasant farmers who do not have enough land to cultivate. To what extent do you agree or disagree? 043

44 It was agreed that the political parties formed by demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC-EP will have the same assurances of security and access to the media as the other political parties already have. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed to keep some coca crops under state supervision and for purely medicinal and scientific purposes. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that the senior members of the FARC-EP (not commanders) who demobilize will not go to prison. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that the members of the FARC-EP, who have been responsible for atrocious crimes and who do not confess their crimes, must pay more than eight (8) years in prison. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that the military and police officers responsible for atrocious crimes and who confess their crimes will be treated by the justice system in the same way as members of the FARC-EP who have confessed atrocious crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that the members of the FARC-EP will consolidate in some regions of the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree? It was agreed that the United Nations will receive all the weapons of the FARC-EP. To what extent do you agree or disagree? See Card C (Appendix B). FARC-EP Participation in Politics All peace processes between governments and insurgent groups involve negotiating conditions so that the rebels can transition from an armed group to a political party or movement. Taking as a point of reference the centrality of the issue of political participation of demobilized ex-combatants, the Americas Barometer study included a series of questions to assess the attitudes of Colombians regarding the FARC-EP s participation in politics. The main conclusion on this subject is that the refusal to give assurances so that the FARC-EP can participate in politics remains constant. In the 2013, 2014 and 2016 studies, only about 20% agree to these assurances being given (Figure 21). 044

45 When asked about attitudes towards the FARC-EP forming a political party, there continues to be low approval, without significant changes over time (Figure 22). Something very similar happens when discussing the possible participation of this organization s political party in local elections: disapproval remains around 70% (Figure 23). 7 out of 10 Colombians disagree with the government giving the necessary assurances so that the FARC-EP can have political participation, after they surrender their weapons. Figure 21. Level of Agreement with the Government Giving Guarantees for FARC-EP Political Participation , 2014 and En desacuerdo De acuerdo Indiferente/indeciso 18.3% 11.0% 70.6% 2014 En desacuerdo De acuerdo Indiferente/indeciso 21.9% 13.0% 65.1% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) 2016 En desacuerdo De acuerdo 23.5% Indiferente/indeciso 11.9% 64.7% Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP The Colombian government must assure that demobilized FARC-EP members can participate in politics. To what extent do you agree or disagree? See Card C (Appendix B). 045

46 Figure 22. Approval of the FARC-EP Forming a Political Party , 2014 and No aprueba Aprueba Indiferente/indeciso 15.4% 16.2% 68.4% 2014 No aprueba Aprueba Indiferente/indeciso 18.6% 12.3% 69.1% 2016 No aprueba 71.0% Aprueba 15.3% Indiferente/indeciso 13.7% % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP That they form a political party. To what extent do you approve or disapprove? See Card D (Appendix B). Figure 23. Approval of the FARC-EP Participating in Local Elections, 2013, 2014 and No aprueba Aprueba Indiferente/indeciso 14.5% 12.3% 73.1% 2014 No aprueba Aprueba Indiferente/indeciso 16.4% 13.4% 70.2% 2016 No aprueba 71.3% Aprueba 15.2% Indiferente/indeciso 13.5% % Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP That they put forward candidates for election. To what extent do you approve or disapprove? See Card D (Annex B). 046

47 From one region of the country to another, we found no significant differences in the approval/disapproval levels for the FARC-EP s political participation. In other words, the regional averages are essentially identical and are similar to the national average. To illustrate this, the results are presented, disaggregated regionally, for the question on the formation of a political party by the members of the FARC-EP (Figure 24). Figure 24. Approval of the FARC-EP Forming a Political Party, by Region, 2016 No aprueba Pacífica Oriental Central Bogotá Caribe 67.4% 71.3% 75.6% 70.1% 68.9% Aprueba Pacífica Oriental Central Bogotá Caribe 19.6% 14.5% 11.7% 15.5% 16.6% 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas LAPOP Pacífica Oriental Central Bogotá Caribe Indiferente/indeciso 13.0% 14.2% 12.7% 14.4% 14.5% That they form a political party. To what extent do you approve or disapprove? See Card D (Appendix B) Finally, for this specific issue of FARC-EP participation in politics, the Democracy Observatory carried out a regression analysis on the determinants of support for this groups participation in politics, revealing that those who have some of the following characteristics are more likely to support it: are interested in politics, support the government, trust the FARC-EP, support the Polo Democrático Alternativo political party, are non-religious, have been victims of the conflict and have a higher level of education (Table 3) 5. 5 The complete results of the model estimation can be found in the Table A.2.(Appendix A): 047

Sitemap